Wage-led Regime, Profit-led Regime and Cycles: a Model<br />(French title for the publication: Régime wage-led, régime profit-led et cycles : un modèle) by Canry, Nicolas
Wage-led Regime, Profit-led Regime and Cycles: a
Model(French title for the publication: Re´gime
wage-led, re´gime profit-led et cycles : un mode`le)
Nicolas Canry
To cite this version:
Nicolas Canry. Wage-led Regime, Profit-led Regime and Cycles: a Model(French title for the
publication: Re´gime wage-led, re´gime profit-led et cycles : un mode`le). E´conomie applique´e :
archives de l’Institut de science e´conomique applique´e, Institut des sciences mathe´matiques et
e´conomiques applique´es - ISMEA, 2005, LVIII (1), pp.143-163. <halshs-00149942>
HAL Id: halshs-00149942
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00149942
Submitted on 13 Jun 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
WAGE-LED REGIME, PROFIT-LED REGIME AND CYCLES: A
MODEL
Nicolas CANRY
CES Matisse, Université Paris 1
We propose a dynamic model which deals with the impact of income distribution
variations on growth. In that goal, we use two models : the classical Goodwin model
(1967) and the Bhaduri-Marglin model (1990), which also focuses on the links between
income distribution and growth, but in a Keynesian frame. We introduce Keynesian
demand constraints within the Goodwin model and modify its investment function,
which becomes non-linear. With these new hypotheses, we show that Goodwin cy-
cles may either be maintained or disappear. If most trajectories oscillate around a
classical equilibrium, the economy may also fall during a cycle into a Keynesian un-
employment state. In that case, cycle dynamic is broken because wages are squeezed
whereas the economy is in a wage-led regime. This model allows to capture some
specic characteristics of the French economic situation that took place in the 1980s-
1990s.
The impact of income distribution on growth has been studied by two di¤er-
ent strands of economic literature, belonging respectively to the classical and post-
Keynesian traditions. On the classical side, Goodwin (1967) proposes a formaliza-
tion of endogenous cycles where investment is directly related to saving. Because
the propensity to save of entrepreneurs is higher than that of workers, an increase
(respectively a decrease) in the prot share always boosts (respectively hinders) ac-
cumulation and growth. The latter assumption has however been questioned by
some Keynesian economists. According to Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), the e¤ect
on growth of a rise in prots remains uncertain: it may either be positive (prot-
led regime) or negative (wage-led regime). Nevertheless, the Bhaduri-Marglin model
remains incomplete as it does not tackle dynamic issues.
CES Matisse, Université Paris 1. MSE 106-112, boulevard de lHôpital 75013 Paris. France;
e-mail address : nicolas.canry@univ-paris1.fr.
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A few contributions have already introduced Keynesian hypotheses in a classical
framework. Skott (1989) integrates a class struggle dynamics in a Kaldorian trade
cycle model. Duménil and Levy (1999) build a model combining a short term Key-
nesian dynamics with a long term classical one, with adjusting prices. In this article,
we try to incorporate both congurations of Bhaduri-Marglins model within the
Goodwin framework. We so underline that the e¤ects of income distribution evolu-
tions on growth fundamentally depend on the growth regime existing in the economy.
Besides, we assume that the two regimes emphasized by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990)
are endogenous and are themselves related to the level of the wage share. Thus we
propose a dynamic model where growth a¤ects income distribution, which itself may
modify in return the nature of the growth regime and lead to a new income distri-
bution. One main conclusion is that "Goodwin cycles" can either be maintained or
disappear. In this last case, the dynamics jumps from one equilibrium to another
that includes long lasting unemployment. This conclusion allows to capture some
specic characteristics of the French economic situation during the 1980s-90s when
both prot share and unemployment rate durably increased together. Such a fact
cannot entirely be explained by the Goodwin model and needs therefore to take into
account Bhaduri-Marglins assumptions.
The rst section is briey devoted to Goodwins and Bhaduri-Marglins models,
and the way they can be articulated. This combination is then formalized in the
second section. The third section emphasizes our main conclusions that are illus-
trated by simulations. In the fourth section our results are confronted to the French
economic dynamics of the 1980s-90s. Lastly a short conclusion is given.
I. THE GOODWIN (1967) AND BHADURI-MARGLIN (1990)
MODELS
The Goodwin model is a well-known mathematical representation of endogenous
cycles rooted in the Marxian tradition. According to Goodwin, cycles are the con-
sequence of the class struggle upon the sharing of the value added between workers
and capitalists (wages against prots). To give a better approach of the mechanisms
of this model, let us introduce a situation characterized by a high unemployment.
Real wages increase less than labour productivity according to the iron law. Conse-
quently prot share increases, investment being proportionally raised. Accumulation
and growth then push the demand for labour that leads to a decline of unemploy-
ment. This phenomenon restores the wage bargaining power of trade-unions, which
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progressively brings about a prot-squeeze. This weaker protability (and thus the
weaker level of saving) leads to a drop of investment that provokes accumulation
slowdown as well as an increase in unemployment. Thus, a new cycle begins.
The hypotheses of the model are:
- The production factors are labour L and capital K
- Labour productivity a and labour force n grow at a constant rate  and :
a = a0e
t  > 0
n = n0e
t  > 0
- Wages are entirely consumed, prots entirely saved and invested, then
:
K = Y   wL =

1  w
a

Y = (1  !)Y (1)
where w is the wage rate and ! the wage share in the value added.
- The capital-output ratio  is constant. Thus
:
K
K
=
:
Y
Y
=
(1  !)

(2)
- The real wage growth rate
:
w
w
is related to the employment level v
:
w
w
=   + v ;  > 0 (3)
By solving this model, we get a two di¤erential equations system :
v =
 
1

  (+ )  !


v
:
! = [v   (+ )]! (4)
The equilibrium is given by ! = 1 (+) and v = +

. At the equilibrium,
the Jacobian has a trace equalling zero and a positive determinant (= 

!v ). The
eigenvalues are complex and conjugate, their real part equalling zero. The dynamics
of the system is a cycle oscillating around the center (vortex E on gure 1) that
corresponds to the system equilibrium.
Fig. I. The Goodwin cycle.
Says law (according to which growth is never demand constrained) is implicit
in the Goodwin model and implies that the level of investment always equals 
and is determined by prots (prots generate investment and not the contrary
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like in the Keynesian analysis of Kalecki). This hypothesis has been criticized by
Keynesian economists, highlighting that the amount of investment does not depend
directly on saving level. Following this argument, a specication of investment is
needed for building a new model. However this should not prevent from taking into
account protability as a central determinant of both investment decision and saving
behaviour, as Robinson (1962) emphasized it. In that sense, the Bhaduri-Marglin
model analyzes the e¤ects of income distribution on growth through the impact of
prot-share evolutions upon investment on the one hand and saving on the other
hand. The authors show that output growth can be supported either by wages
increase (wage-led regime) or prots increase (prot-led regime).
In their model, consumption is given by:
C = (1  sw)W + (1  sr)R (5)
where W is the payroll, R are the total prots (Y = R +W ), sw and sr are saving
propensities of workers and capitalists respectively, with sr > sw. It follows that:
S
K
=
1

[(sr   sw)z + swz] (6)
with K, the level of physical capital of the economy, S the saving,  = R
Y
, z = Y
Y
(where Y is the output level when the capital stock is fully used), and  = K
Y
(constant)y.
The investment function has two explicative variables: the prot rate R
K
and the
rate of capacity utilization z, which captures the demand e¤ect:
I
K
= i0 + ir
R
K
+ iz
Y
Y
= i0 + z(ir


+ iz) ir; iz > 0 (7)
As I
K
= S
K
, we get a relation between z and :
z =
i0
(sr   sw   ir) + (sw   iz) (8)
An economy is prot-led if @z
@
> 0 and wage-led otherwise. The nature of the eco-
nomic regime rests only on the sensitivity of both saving and investment to variations
of  : the economy is wage-led if ir > sr   sw (we suppose i0 > 0). Therefore the
market equilibrium condition implies either an increasing or a decreasing relation
between wage share and output. The e¤ect of prot on growth is then mitigated.
yNote that in Goodwin model, Y always equals Y .
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In the Goodwin model, recession periods generate their own recovery thanks to
investment takeo¤ (boosted by higher prots). Here, this recovery might not happen
because:
- either investment grows less than savings when prot share increases, so that
global e¤ect on growth is negative. This arises if the economy is wage-led.
- or recession has a direct negative impact on investment due to aggregate demand
decrease. Investment evolutions depend on two antagonistic e¤ects: the positive
e¤ect of prot recovery (Goodwin), and the negative impact of economic activity
slowdown (negative Keynesian accelerator).
In his review of the Bhaduri-Marglin model, Taylor (1991) suggests that the
nature of the economic regime could directly depend on the initiallevel of wages:
the greater it is, the more likely is the economy to be prot-led. This rather intuitive
interpretation can be illustrated by an inverted U-shaped curve, which can be used
in a fruitful manner in a dynamic modelz.
II. THE PROPOSED MODEL
On Figure 2, we combine the Taylor curvewith a wage-setting (WS) curve
(i.e. a wage equation where the level of real wage depends positively on output,
see Jackman, Layard, Nickell (1991)). In this framework, output is determined by
aggregate demand which itself depends on the wage share. There is a wage share
level ! which separates wage-led and prot-led areas from each other. As long as
wage share is below !, the positive e¤ect of wage share increase on consumption
outweighs the (possible) negative e¤ect on investment (note that investment itself
may even be supported by an accelerator e¤ect in this case). On the contrary, beyond
!, prots are threatened to be squeezed so that every wage increase will depress
investment more than it boosts consumption. Only a decrease of the wage share
could recover investment and growth in this area. It is important to note that the
dynamical dimension of our model comes from the endogeneity of the wage share.
We see that this dynamics generates cycles around one rst equilibrium but may
bifurcate to another one, where unemployment and prot share are both very high.
Indeed, a too large wage share reduction during the recession period of the cycle
may prevent investment to recover (in spite of the increase of prot share), that
zNote that this representation does not correspond at all to the analytical model of Bhaduri-
Marglin, since the sign of z from (8) does not depend on . In the next section, we will try to
give a mathematical formalization of this Taylor curve.
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actually breaks the cycle. This new equilibrium is characterized by unemployment
and weakness of global demand. This is the reason why we call it a "Keynesian
equilibrium" (see gure 2 below).
Fig. II. Combining the "Taylor curve" with a wage-setting (WS) curve.
In the rest of this article, we propose a macroeconomic model which captures
these dynamics. For that purpose, we keep the framework of the Goodwin model,
so the wage equation is a Phillips curve (not aWS curve). Nevertheless, as we shall
see, we modify the investment function, which allows us to establish an inverted
U-shaped relation between wage share and output growth rate.
Our model is built in discrete time. All coe¢ cients are supposed positive. The
rms production function is given by:
Yt = atLt (9)
The rates of growth of labour productivity at and labour force nt are  and 
respectively. We call w the real wage rate, ! the wage share and  the prot share.
II.1. Goods market
We suppose that production depends on aggregate demand and not on the cur-
rent stock of capital as in Goodwin model. At each period t, consumption and
investment determine production, which is then shared between wages and prots.
Consumption and investment of the following period are thus directly related to the
income distribution of the current period.
We suppose that saving propensities of workers and capitalists are respectively
equal to 0 and 1. Consumption in (t+ 1) equals the payroll of period t:
Ct+1 = wtLt (10)
Investment level in (t + 1) depends on protability and on a variable capturing
the demand faced by rms. Protability is measured by the prot share of the pre-
ceding period t. Consumption of the current period replaces the capacity utilization
rate to capture the demand e¤ect. Nevertheless, demand a¤ects investment as soon
as protability is high enough to allow rms to invest (for example, imagine that
banks demand a minimum level of protability to lend). Thats why we propose a
multiplicative form between protability and demand variables in the function:
It+1 = Ct+1t = Ct+1 (1  !t)  > 0 (11)
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In the following, we will suppose  > 1. From (10) and (11), the goods market
equilibrium Y = C + I is given by:
Yt+1 = Yt [1  (1  !t)(1  !t)] (12)
This is an inverted U-shaped curve between the output growth rate and the wage
share. Both prot-led and wage-led congurations dont depend only on model para-
meters anymore (like in the Bhaduri-Marglin model) but on an endogenous variable,
i.e. the wage-share. Taking (9) into account, we easily obtain from (12) a relation
between vt+1 and vt (v is the employment rate).
II.2. Labour market
We keep the Goodwin wage equation (in discrete time):
wt+1   wt
wt
= vt+1    ;  > 0 (13)
From (13), it follows:
!t+1 =


1 + 
vt+1 +
1  
1 + 

!t (14)
Note immediately that 1 
1+
< 1. In the following, we suppose that  1 < 1 
1+
< 1.
We nally obtain a two equations system:8><>:
vt+1 =
[1 (1 !t)(1 !t)]
(1+)(1+)
vt = f(vt; !t)
!t+1 =
1
1+
h
[1 (1 !t)(1 !t)]
(1+)(1+)
vt + (1  )
i
!t = g(vt; !t)
(15)
In the following, we note  = (1 + )(1 + ) > 1.
II.3. Equilibria determination
Solving the system for xed points, i.e., vt+1 = vt and !t+1 = !t (demonstrations
of this section are in Appendix 1), we then can draw the corresponding phase diagram
(gure 3). On gure 3, we have replaced employment rate v by unemployment rate
u = 1  v.
Fig. III. Phase Diagram
Note that if u = 1 (v = 0), then
:
u = 0 ; if ! = 0, then
:
! = 0. Therefore
(u = 1; ! = 0) is one equilibrium of the system (E1). The other equilibria are
7
a saddle-point (E2) and a center (locally), E3. Thus the system has a center - in
accordance with the Goodwin model - but exhibits two other equilibria, especially a
locally stable one, E1. This latter result contradicts the Goodwin model.
III. SIMULATIONS
In this section we have calibrated our model so as to exhibit various dynamics
that we can obtain from our model. All these simulations are presented in the plan
(wage share, unemployment rate).
As noted by Harvie (2000), the econometric estimates for the center in the Good-
win model are far from actual values, what is true for our own simulations too.
Concerning  and  in the wage equation, we have taken values between 0,5 and
1, like in Harvie (2000) estimates (for OECD countries where this relation is signif-
icant). Labour force and labour productivity growths are respectively of 2 % and
3 % ( = 0; 02 and  = 0; 03) so that  ' 1; 05. The  coe¢ cient in investment
function has been chosen such as !1 and !

2 remain real ( > 1; 56).  has been xed
at 1; 6. We suppose that, at equilibrium E3, v is equal to 0; 95. To keep v =
+

constant, we must modify  when we modify  (i.e. the sensibility of real wage
growth to employment). In our di¤erent simulations we take as initial conditions
v0 = 0; 98 (unemployment rate of 2 %) and !0 = 0; 83 (!0 is between !1 and !

2).
The unique aspect distinguishing our di¤erent simulations is the varying value for 
(and consequently the value of  too, to keep v = 0; 95), which increases from 0,5
to 1.
The rst simulation ( = 0; 5, see gure 4) shows that our model allows us to
reproduce Goodwin cycles.
Fig. IV. First simulation: Goodwin cycles.
Figure 5 (where  = 0; 7) exhibits the attractive e¤ect of E2 on these cycles.
Fig. V. Second simulation: Goodwin cycles and attracting e¤ect of E2.
In the third simulation (gure 6), the dynamics "bifurcates" and is attracted by
the equilibrium E1(0; 0) and there is no cycle anymore.
Fig. VI. Third simulation: The Goodwin cycle disappears.
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Here cycle dynamics is interrupted because of a too important wage squeeze
during a recession phase. As a result, consumption brings down investment in its fall
in spite of prot share recovery. As soon as investment increases when consumptions
drops, cycles are maintained although the model is demand constrained. However, if
consumption becomes too weak, that may o¤set the positive e¤ect of prot recovery
on investment. Consumption and investment may thus fall together what induces
a cumulative slump. Cycles disappear because neither consumption nor investment
can restore growth. Slowdown exacerbates wage-share fall, whereas the economy is in
the wage-led area (i.e. wages should increase to boost growth). Moreover, the labour
force growth exceeds the growth of labour demand as soon as wage-share is lower
than !1. That is the reason why slump is cumulative and the economy collapses to
E1(0; 0) (which does not appear on the gure because of the retained scaling. See
appendix 1). The dynamics leading to this equilibrium is thus characterized by a
form of Harrodian instability (which reminds us Keyness banana economy parable
in A Treatise on Money (1930)): higher unemployment induces weaker wages, which
strengthens recession and unemployment (in wage-led regime), and so on. Such an
instability could be softened by supposing that high and persistent unemployment
has no e¤ect on wages anymore. Moreover, economic policy is a very e¢ cient tool
against Harrodian instability (Harrod (1948)), even if our model does not emphasize
it.
Thanks to this model, we propose an interpretation of growing unemployment
which characterized the French economy in the 1980s and 1990s.
IV. THE CASE OF FRENCH UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE 1980s
AND 1990s
Figure 7 sketches the French trajectory between 1960 and 2000 as it can be seen
with the French Goodwin curve that we present.
Fig. VII. French Goodwin curve, 1960-2000.
In the 1960s, unemployment remained below 3 %. This situation strengthened
the bargaining power of trade unions in a context of labour productivity growth slow-
down. That partly explained the takeo¤ of wage-share in the 1970s which squeezed
prots and reduced investment (Bruno and Sachs, 1985). At the beginning of the
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1980s, the competitive disination has been run with the purpose to diminish un-
employment by promoting exportations through ination ght and wage austerity
(Blanchard and Muet, 1993). Unfortunately, the prot-share recovery in the 1980s
came along with a very short decrease of unemployment. Therefore, since the mid-
dle of 1980s, we can observe a sharp breakdown in the French trajectory with the
theoretical dynamics of Goodwin model. Our model proposes an explanation of the
lasting and joint increase of unemployment and prot-share (which has reached his-
torical high levels in the 1990s without sensitive e¤ect on investment) from 1982 to
1997. Note however that our model can explain neither the prot-share increase in
the 1960s nor the coming back of sustained growth from 1997 (not shown on the
gure).
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, Keynesian demand constraints have been introduced in the Good-
win model. We built a non-linear investment function including protability and
accelerator components. From the goods market equilibrium we thus get a mathe-
matical relation between output growth rate and wage share. This relation is rst
increasing then decreasing, what corresponds to two distinct growth regimes studied
by Bhaduri-Marglin: the wage and prot-led regimes. We keep the wage equation of
Goodwin model to make our model dynamic. Therefore, the economy can be alter-
natively wage and prot-led. We then show that Goodwin cycles can be maintained
in this new framework. However cycles are not the only possible trajectories of the
system anymore: the economy may also be attracted by a cumulative slump path.
This results from the drop of the too classical and mechanistic hypothesis of ex ante
identity between prot and investment postulated by the Goodwin model. In our
model a large wage decrease can reduce consumption so much that investment will
not take o¤ despite prot restoration. In that case investment and consumption
decline together as in a typical Keynesian unemployment case. Nothing can then
restore growth and the economy collapses toward a zero output level. We have not
succeeded in stabilizing this Keynesianequilibrium before zero yet, which remains
a weakness of our model. Thanks to it, we manage to sketch the French economic
dynamics between 1970 and 1997 and the long lasting growth of both unemployment
and prot share from the end of 1980s. Nevertheless, it cannot explain the economic
recovery observed after 1997 in that country.
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APPENDIX A
MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DYNAMIC (SECTION II).
We suppose that:
 =

1 + 
and  =
1  
1 + 
:
From (15) it results that vt+1 = vt if v = 0 or if (1   !)(1   !) = 1   ,
where roots are called !1 and !

2 (!

1  !2) and belong to [0; 1].
The nature (real or complex) and values of !1 and !

2 depend only on  and :
We will now consider that both !1 and !

2 are real, positive and inferior to 1, which
implies restrictive conditions on . For example, if  = 1; 05, it is easy to show that
 must be greater than 1; 56 (in the unlikely case where  = 1; 1, we must have
 > 1; 86)x. In these conditions !1!

2 =


, therefore !1 



1=2
and !2 



1=2
.
!t+1 = !t if ! = 0 or if v =
(1 )
[1 (1 !)(1 !)] , which is rstly decreasing
then increasing in !.
We nally obtain three equilibria :
E1(v
 = 0; ! = 0) E2(v =
(1  )

; ! = !1) and E3(v
 =
(1  )

; ! = !2)
The Jacobian is equal to:
J =
 
1

[1  (1  !)(1  !)] 1

v( + 1  2!)


(!)2 (( + 1)  !) 

v!(2( + 1)  3!) + 
!
In the neighborhood of E1, both eigenvalues are real and lower than 1. E1 is
locally a stable equilibrium.
In the neighborhood of E2, the trace of JE2 is strictly greater than 2 since !

1 


1=2
. Consequently, E2 is a saddle-point.
In the neighborhood of E3, the trace of JE3 is lower than 2 since !

2 >



1=2
.
Roots are thus complex and conjugate. Their modulus is 1 so that E3 is locally a
center.
xThis restriction on  is coherent with equation (11). In this model, the entire wage bill is spent
on consumption (of the next period). Then new investment can only be nanced by past prots
and new bank credits. We then may expect that It+1Yt > t. To t this consistency condition, our
investment behaviour equation (11) must verify  > 1! (note that  is a constant parameter and
that is credit which is the adjusting variable here). Empirically  is very plausibly much bigger
than 1! .
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APPENDIX B
SECOND SIMULATION (SECTION III).
Here we reproduce the same gure as in the text (gure 6) but on a larger scale, so
as to represent the complete trajectory towards E1(0; 0):
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FIGURES
Fig. I. The Goodwin cycle.
Fig. II. Combining the "Taylor curve" with a wage-setting (WS) curve.
Fig. III. Phase Diagram.
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Fig. IV. First simulation: Goodwin cycles.  = 0:50  ' 0:45  = 1:60  = 1:05
!0 = 0:83 v0 = 0:98 v
 ' 0:95 !1 ' 0:75 !2 ' 0:88
Fig. V. Second simulation: Goodwin cycles and attracting e¤ect of E2.  = 0:70
 ' 0:45  = 1:60  = 1:05 !0 = 0:83 v0 = 0:98 v ' 0:95 !1 ' 0:75
!2 ' 0:88
Fig. VI. Third simulation: The Goodwin cycle disappears.  = 0:90  ' 0:83
 = 1:60  = 1:05 !0 = 0:83 v0 = 0:98 v
 ' 0:95 !1 ' 0:75 !2 ' 0:88
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Fig. VII. French Goodwin curve, 1960-2000.
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